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Notes
OF STORKS AND FOXES: EMPLOYMENT TESTING
AND BACK PAY
"Congress has now . . . provided that tests or criteria
for employment or promotion may not provide equality of
opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk to
the stork and the fox. On the contrary, Congress has now
. . . required that the posture and condition of the job-
seeker be taken into account. It has-to resort again to the
fable-provided that the vessel in which the milk is proffered
be one all seekers can use."
-Chief Justice Burger in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.I
A Fox one day invited a Stork to dinner, and being
disposed to divert himself at the expense of his guest, pro-
vided nothing for the entertainment but some thin soup in a
shallow dish. This the Fox lapped up very readily, while the
Stork, unable to gain a mouthful with her long narrow bill,
was as hungry at the end of dinner as at the beginning. The
Fox meanwhile professed his regret at seeing his guest eat so
sparingly, and feared that the dish was not seasoned to her
liking. The Stork said little but begged that the Fox would
do her the honor of returning her visit. Accordingly, he
agreed to dine with her on the following day. He arrived true
to his appointment and the dinner was ordered forthwith.
But when it was served up he found to his dismay that it was
contained in a narrow necked vessel, down which the Stork
readily thrust her long neck and bill, while the Fox was
obliged to content himself with licking the neck of the jar.2
The enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641
raised the hope of a bias-free job market. It has been the court
1. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Griggs is discussed at note 15 infra.
2. Quoted in COOPER & RABB, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LMGATION: Materials for
a Clinical Law Course 27 (unpublished collection of materials for use in Columbia Law
School's Employment Rights Project) [hereinafter cited as COOPER & RABB].
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended, Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Supp. I, 1972). In general Title VII
proscribes discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; provides remedies for violations; and creates and defines the powers of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. For a comprehensive discussion of Title
VII and cases arising thereunder, see Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimi-
nation and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Developments-Employment Discrimination].
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order, however, which has given substance to the legislative
promise. In Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co.,4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has aggressively inter-
preted the law regarding employment testing and back pay
awards.
Moody and several of his black co-workers brought a class
action suit against the Albemarle Paper Company based in North
Carolina5 and the local paperworkers union' pursuant to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Claiming that the company's
seniority system and pre-employment testing procedures were
discriminatory, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and back
pay.
The district court found that Albemarle and the union local
had engaged in illegal discriminatory employment practices.7
Consequently it enjoined them from further discriminatory con-
duct and specifically directed the implementation of a plant-wide
seniority system in place of the existing job seniority system
which was found to have perpetuated the proscribed discrimina-
tion." The defendants did not appeal these determinations. How-
ever, the court refused to order the abolition or modification of
Albemarle's testing procedures and denied the plaintiffs' request
for back pay. On these issues the plaintiffs appealed. On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that the testing procedures were inadequate because Albemarle
had failed to demonstrate that the tests were job-related. Fur-
ther, the court ruled that the district court had erred in refusing
to grant back pay.' The court's resolution of these two issues may
represent a further step toward ending employment discrimina-
tion.
4. 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3349 (Dec. 17, 1974). The
defendant in Moody petitioned for rehearing en banc. In response to a question certified
to it by the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court held that a senior judge may not partici-
pate in the decision of whether to rehear a case en banc. - U.S. - , 41 L. Ed. 2d 358
(1974). The Court's ruling had the effect of denying the petition for rehearing.
5. Subsequent to the institution of the suit, the defendant mill underwent a change
of corporate ownership; the court, however, deemed it convenient to refer to the corporate
defendant by its former name. 474 F.2d at 136-37.
6. Originally, the international union was also named as codefendant; its motion to
dismiss the suit against it was granted. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 271 F. Supp. 27
(E.D.N.C. 1967).
7. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 4 F.E.P. Cas. 561 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
8. For discussion of the role of seniority in employment discrimination, see Cooper
& Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to
Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Cooper & Sobol]; Note, Title VII: Seniority Discrimination and the Incumbent
Negro, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1260 (1967).
9. Judge Boreman concurred in the court's decision regarding testing procedures
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TESTING PROCEDURES
Title VII expressly authorizes the use of "professionally de-
veloped ability test[s]"'' in making employment decisions. It
has been noted that, while the widespread use of occupational
tests as employee selection devices is, in one sense, merely a
manifestation of the American fascination with objective mea-
sures of ability, such tests can, by clothing employment decisions
with apparent objectivity, be used as a shield against charges of
discrimination." Moreover, employers might unintentionally dis-
criminate by the careless use of such tests. 2 The Fourth Circuit's
decision in Moody, demanding a very strict standard of proof of
conformity with federal regulations, 3 is an example of the in-
creasingly sensitive judicial response to this situation.
Albemarle's use of certain testing instruments as part of its
employee selection and promotion process began in 1958 as a
result of a two-year period of experimentation. In 1963, on the
basis of a brief study, the company decided to continue to employ
one of the tests it had originally instituted, the Revised Beta
Examination (Beta), a non-verbal device intended to measure the
intelligence of both illiterates and people who simply do not
speak English. In addition, because of anticipated increased men-
tal demands on its workers occasioned by the growing use of
printed plant machinery instructions, Albemarle adopted the
Wonderlic Test, a verbal test purporting to measure general men-
tal ability.
Albemarle's mill engaged in the pulp-to-paper manufactur-
ing process. The plant's operations were organized departmen-
tally along typical industry lines: eleven separate departments
while Judge Bryan dissented. Judge Bryan concurred in the court's back pay deci-
sion-insofar as the employees had suffered economic loss by reason of the discriminatory
seniority system-while Judge Boreman dissented.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). The legislative history of this section is discussed
in Developments-Employment Discrimination, supra note 3, at 1123-26.
11. Developments-Employment Discrimination, supra note 3, at 1120-21.
12. It has been suggested that such tests have, in fact, been used carelessly. Id. at
1121 n.45 and accompanying text.
13. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines on Employee Selec-
tion Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-1607.14 (1970), interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
See note 10 supra and accompanying text. The Guidelines which permit the use of only
job-related tests, were the subject of favorable comment by the Supreme Court in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), discussed at note 15 infra. Among the lower
federal court cases according favorable comment to the Guidelines are United States v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972),
and Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970).
The Guidelines may presently be found in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1-1607.14 (1974).
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contained a total of seventeen lines of progression or career lad-
ders. Test results, supervisory evaluations, and seniority were the
prime criteria for promotion. Since 1963, however, applicants for
only eight departments, involving fourteen lines of progression,
were required to score successfully on the tests.'4
In 1971, prompted by the decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.'5 that employers have
the burden of showing that employment qualifications having a
disparate racial impact are related to job performance, Albemarle
commissioned a study to correlate test results and job perform-
ance of its employees. The resulting validation study dealt with
ten job groups in eight departments for which tests were re-
quired. The performance of only higher level employees was
considered in the study. The validation process was conducted for
thirty percent of the positions for which Albemarle required tests.
The test scores were then compared with evaluations by two su-
pervisors of each worker's actual job performance. Since no job
analyses' were undertaken for any of the positions, these evalua-
14. 474 F.2d at 137.
15. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). In Griggs, the Court ruled that when employment practices
are shown to have an adverse racial impact, the employer must justify those practices by
demonstrating "business necessity," which, at the least, requires a showing of "job-
relatedness": "If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431.
The view has been expressed that "mere speculation or surmise by an employer will
not constitute a sufficient justification" to satisfy the Griggs mandate. COOPER & RAB,
supra note 2, at 90. This view finds support in the following statement by the Griggs Court:
[The employer's high school completion requirement and intelligence test were
adopted] . . . without meaningful study of their relationship to job-performance
ability. Rather, . . . the requirements were instituted on the Company's judgment
that they generally would improve the overall quality of the work force.
401 U.S. at 431.
In addition, the Court noted that "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent" is no
defense where job-relatedness has not been proved. Id. at 432.
For concise summary of the factual setting in Griggs, see Note, Employment Discrim-
ination: The Burden Is On Business, 31 MD. L. REV. 255, 256-58 (1971). See generally
Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employ-
ment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen].
16. 474 F.2d at 138.
17. The performance of a job analysis is the first step in any serious effort to deter-
mine the strength of the relationship between test performance and job performance. Job
analysis involves the identification of each element of a job in order to determine the
relative importance of each. Unless such an analysis is performed, just what the job is
remains difficult to define. The selection of performance criteria is likewise difficult.
"With a job analysis [,however,] a test selector can undertake a refined and intelligent
choice of selection procedures. The job analysis will help isolate the performance criteria
. . . with which test performance may be correlated." COOPER & RABB, supra note 2, at
app. B, 8-9.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines on Employee Selection
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tions were of a totally subjective nature-the only guideline for
the supervisors' assessments was the directive to tell "just how
well the guy can do the job when he's feeling right."'' 8
The court of appeals was thus presented with the issue of
whether a validation study of an employment test, incomplete in
its construction and application, nonetheless suffices to meet the
Griggs mandate. 9 Writing for the majority, Judge Craven held
that all employment tests having an adverse impact on minority
employment must be shown to be related to job performance in
full accordance with the validation standards of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures 0 and that validation must be performed for
each substantially discrete job category for which such tests are
required.2
In an earlier decision, Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.," the
Fourth Circuit reviewed several cases2 3 in which business neces-
sity had been argued as a justification for maintaining discrimi-
natory employment practices and concluded:
Collectively these cases conclusively establish that the
applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business
Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4-1607.14 (1974), reflect the importanct of job analysis.
Section 1607.4(c) provides:
Evidence of a test's validity should consist of empirical data demonstrating
that the test is predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of
work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates
are being evaluated.
Section 1607.5(a) provides, in part: "[E]vidence for content or construct validity should
be accompanied by sufficient information from job analyses to demonstrate the relevance
of the content. . . or the construct .. " Section 1607.5(b)(3) provides, in part: "What-
ever criteria are used they must represent major or critical work behaviors as revealed by
careful job analyses."
18. 474 F.2d at 138.
19. The finding that Albemarle's testing procedures had an adverse racial impact
was supported by plaintiff's exhibits, which demonstrated that ninety-six percent of the
whites passed the Wonderlic Series while only sixty-four percent of the blacks did so. Id.
at 138 n.1 and accompanying text.
I The degree of difference between the test performance of minority groups and nonmi-
nority groups that will lead a court to conclude that the test has a legally significant
adverse impact is, of course, open to conjecture. This problem is discussed in CooPER &
RABB, supra note 2, at 81-84.
20. See note 13 supra.
21. 474 F.2d at 138-39. As the court observed, tests need not be validated for each
job where there is no signficant difference between the various jobs. Id. at 139, citing 29
C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)(2) (1970) (unchanged by July 1, 1974, revision). However, Albemarle's
failure to perform job analyses, see note 17 supra, precluded the inference that the jobs
were substantially indistinguishable. 474 F.2d at 140.
22. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
23. Id. at 797-98.
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purpose for adhering to a challenged practice. The test is
whether there exists an overriding legitimate business pur-
pose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and effi-
cient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose
must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial im-
pact; the challenged activity must effectively carry out the
business purpose it is alleged to serve ... 24
In Moody, the court was presented with the opportunity to give
more specific content to the Robinson standard. Inspired no
doubt by the Supreme Court's unanimous reversal of its decision
in Griggs,2" the court definitively enunciated the Fourth Circuit's
position on test validation requirements.
The court found Albemarle's testing procedures inadequate
in two respects. The court initially took Albemarle to task for its
incomplete validation 26-specifically, its failure to conduct a "job
24. Id. at 798 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). See United States v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (using similar language in proscribing a
seniority system).
25. 420 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (where the Fourth
Circuit ruled, in effect, that the job-relatedness of a test is, in itself, of no legal conse-
quence; that a test is unlawful only if utilized with discriminatory intent or in a discrimi-
natory manner).
26. "The validation process is the process of studying the relationship between
ability to perform well on the test or other selection standard and ability to perform well
in serving the employer's needs." COOPER & RAaB, supra note 2, at 116. Cooper and Rabb
proceed to describe the three basic validation techniques recognized by the "[t]he Guide-
lines and standard texts." Id. at 117. Except as otherwise noted, the following is based on
Cooper and Rabb's discussion, id. at 17-19.
Criterion-related validation, the preferred technique, concerns the identification of
the relationship between test performance and work performance as measured by some
performance criterion. Test performance data may be derived through either a predictive
or a concurrent study. While the predictive study is preferable because individuals are
first tested and then put to work, thus enabling a statistical evaluation of how well the
test predicted actual job performance, such studies are often not economically feasible.
As an alternative, a concurrent study, in which the test is administered to present employ-
ees and their scores are compared with present work performance, may be undertaken.
While predictive studies are the first choice of researchers, the EEOC has recognized
their impracticability and has accepted carefully conducted concurrent studies. Develop-
ments-Employment Discrimination, supra note 3, at 1122-23.
Content validation, somewhat more subjective than criterion-related validation, in-
volves a comparison of the content of the job and the test. For example, a typing test used
for screening applicants for a typing job would be content-valid.
Construct validation, farthest removed of the three techniques from actual job per-
formance, refers to the relationship between the mental and physical attributes needed
on a job and a test which measures the same traits.
For additional materials dealing with this complex area see AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL
Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST AND MANUALS (1966); M.
DUNNETT, PERSONNEL SELECTION AND PLACEMENT (1966); J. GUILFORD, FUNDAMENTAL STATIS-
TICS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION (1965); Ghiselli, The Generalization of Validity, 12
PERSONNEL PSYCH. 397 (1959).
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analysis." Job analysis is the first step in the process of determin-
ing whether there is a positive relationship between ability to
perform well on a test and the capacity to perform acceptably in
the target job. Analysis involved the task of defining a job's com-
ponent elements and determining the relative importance of
each. The aim of this procedure is to facilitate the identification
of objective performance criteria with which test achievement can
be compared." Without the identification of such criteria, it is
difficult to determine whether test performance accurately pre-
dicts job performance.
Proceeding in its critical analysis, the court implied that
Albemarle took the easy way out with respect to the formulation
of its supervisory guidelines: Albemarle ignored the EEOC's
objective standards and simply compared test scores with ad hoc
supervisory judgments of job elements and worker performance.
Hiring and promotion decisions were made on the basis of these
factors alone.28
In declaring both hiring and promotion procedures unaccept-
able and in formulating the Fourth Circuit's position on the mat-
ter, Judge Craven took note of two Fifth Circuit decisions. In
United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.29 the employer relied
on a research study that demonstrated that test results were cor-
related with supervisors' assessments of each worker's potential
achievement, but not his actual job performance. The Fifth Cir-
cuit ruled that business necessity had not been established. It
observed that "Griggs demands more substantial proof, most
often positive empirical evidence, of the relationship between test
scores and [actual] job performance.""0 Subsequently the court
remarked that the "safest validation method is that which con-
forms with the EEOC Guidelines."'" It appears that the Moody
court also found persuasive another Fifth Circuit case, Rowe v.
General Motors." While implicitly acknowledging that subjective
27. See note 17 supra.
28. The court noted that, assuming arguendo that Albemarle's validation proce-
dures were proper, the district court nonetheless erred in (1) approving use of tests for lines
of progression for which there had been no attempt at validation and (2) in sanctioning
the defendant's use of both tests in regard to positions for which only one test had been
validated. In so ruling Judge Craven rejected Albemarle's contention that such a use of
the tests was justified under the business necessity test by reason of the company's initial
uncertainty as to which line of progression new employees would enter. 474 F.2d at 139-
40.
29. 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
30. Id. at 456.
31. Id.
32. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972). In Rowe the court, in rejecting a promotion system
1974]
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judgments, if fairly made, pose no problem, the Moody court
endorsed the recognition in Rowe that a performance evaluation
process which is not tied to previously-defined job elements can
permit both unconscious and deliberate bias to affect ratings and
employment decisions. 33
Judge Craven put the Fourth Circuit on record for the first
time as specifically adopting EEOC validation procedures as the
proper method for determining the job-relatedness of employ-
ment tests. 3 Though there are exceptions, the case law is gener-
ally in accord with this position and with the court's decision not
to be satisfied with an employer's good faith efforts which are
incomplete in formulation and application.35 For example, the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Georgia Power Co.3 1 was con-
fronted with facts similar in that respect to those in Moody. Al-
though it gave the EEOC Guidelines a more qualified endorse-
ment than did the Moody court, it did not hesitate to reject a
validation study which lacked a statistically adequate sample of
minority worker performance. Moreover, while the First Circuit
in Castro v. Reechera7 and the Second Circuit in Vulcan Society
tied to foremen's recommendations, stressed inter alia that
(i) The foreman's recommendation is the indispensible single most important
factor in the promotion process.
(ii) Foremen are given no written instructions pertaining to the qualifications
necessary for promotion. (They are given nothing in writing telling them what to
look for in making their recommendations.)
(iii) Those standards which were determined to be controlling are vague and
subjective.
Id. at 358. The Rowe court further declared that
promotion/transfer procedures which depend almost entirely upon the subjective
evaluation and favorable recommendation of the immediate foreman are a ready
mechanism for discrimination against Blacks much of which can be covertly con-
cealed and, for that matter, not really known to management.
Id. at 359.
33. Cf. Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972). See also Cypress v. Newport News General & Nonsectarian
Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967); Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental Society, 335
F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966); Meredith v. Fair, 298 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1962); Cooper & Sobol,
supra note 8.
34. For an extensive enumeration of cases endorsing the EEOC Guidelines, see
Note, Application of the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation: A Uniform
Standard for both Public and Private Employees, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 505, 524 n.118
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Employment Test Validation].
35. See Note, Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Com-
pany, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 900, 903-904 (1972), and Developments-Employment Discrimi-
nation, supra note 3, at 1132-39, for an analysis of cases-effectively overruled by
Griggs-which did not accept the view that employment tests must be job-related.
36. 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
37. 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972) (brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)).
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of New York City Fire Department, Inc. v. Civil Service
Commission 3 have not gone so far as to require actual statistical
validation of employment tests, they have emphasized that em-
ployers bear a heavy burden of proving the job-relatedness of such
tests. Judge Craven, tersely summarizing the attitude of the
courts, remarked that "[civil rights complainants] are entitled
to more solicitude under the law.""9 Indeed, it is now clear that
test results become legally sufficient as a selection device only
when compared with supervisory ratings which are based on iden-
tified and objective criteria found to be associated with successful
job performance.
Judge Bryan's dissent shows concern for the practical burden
of conforming with the Griggs job-relatedness test; however, this
dissent also manifests a misunderstanding of the validation pro-
cess and the role of job analysis in minimizing supervisory preju-
dices. When combined with an understandable sympathy for
what he views as Albemarle's good faith efforts, Judge Bryan's
misconceptions produce the following bizarre pronouncement:
"Each of the aptitude tests is 'demonstrably a reasonable mea-
sure of job performance'. . . . Thus they are their own proof of
their validation."4' Griggs, however, requires not merely an at-
tempt, but a successful showing of job-relatedness. Federal courts
have likewise shown less willingness to rely so readily on supervi-
sory impartiality.
The Moody test represents an important development of the
Fourth Circuit's position-first presented in Robinson-that
employers have a weighty obligation to ensure that their employ-
38. 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973) aff'g in part, 353 F. Supp. 1092, 360 F. Supp. 1265
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). In a section 1983 suit alleging a discriminatory fire department test,
Judge Friendly, in upholding the lower court, ruled that it was not necessary for an
employment test to be validated predictively or concurrently. Rather, evidence of "careful
preparation" would give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the test is job related. 490
F.2d at 395-96. The court manifested an understandable concern with the possible dangers
of deepening judicial involvement in the analysis and application of advanced and esoteric
statistical validation techniques. While such a position has merit, it carries with it the
danger that courts, frustrated by complex statistical evidence, will gloss over crucial
material and give undue weight to testimony of sincere and painstaking but substantively
meaningless employer efforts to determine tests' job-relatedness. See also Bridgeport
Guardians, Inc. v. Members of the Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d
Cir. 1973).
39. 474 F.2d at 139. Though the court failed to reach a determination of the legal
propriety of Albemarle's testing of only higher level employees as part of its validation
effort, the implication is that prudent employers should derive representative scores from
all position levels. Id. at 140 n.4. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 8, at 1649.
40. 474 F.2d at 148, quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971).
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ment tests4 do not have racially discriminatory ramifications.
Employers in this jurisdiction have now been put on notice that
EEOC Guidelines must be followed-at least to the extent that
an employer's validation efforts produce results comparable to
those which would flow from an actual EEOC study.2
The Moody holding does, however, leave a substantial resi-
dual concern. The economic burden of adhering to such stringent
standards will not, of course, fall equally on all employers. In this
vein it is interesting to note that recent testing decisions have
involved comparatively large employers with the resources to fi-
nance and conduct acceptable validation studies. A case involv-
ing a relatively small business concern would quite likely elicit
more judicial sympathy and possibly result in the approval of
tests having a substantial adverse impact on minorities.43
BACK PAY
Title VII imparts to federal courts the authority to grant
relief, in the form of back pay awards," from unlawful employ-
ment practices. Although the granting of such relief is discretion-
ary,45 courts have been especially mindful of the remedial aims
41. Other selection criteria have been found to have an adverse impact on minori-
ties. See, e.g., Adams v. Miami Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 454 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 843 (1972) (veto rights of existing members), and Gregory v.
Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd as modified, 472 F.2d 631
(9th Cir. 1972) (arrest record requirements).
42. Recent commentar has noted that while Griggs proscribed tests having an
adverse impact and no manifest relation to job performance, it left unanswered questions
concerning the nature and amount of evidence required to determine whether a test is
sufficiently job-related. Employment Test Validation, supra note 34; Note, Employment
Discrimination: The Burden Is On Business, 31 MD. L. REV. 255, 264-65 (1971). The
Moody decision, requiring as it does complete and properly-conducted validation studies
in accordance with EEOC Guidelines, is a clear response to these concerns.
43. For comment on this troublesome area, see generally Blumrosen, supra note 15,
at 100-07; Ruch & Ash, Comments on Psychological Testing, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 608 (1969);
Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Standardized Ability Tests in Employment and
Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691 (1968); Employment Test Validation, supra note 34,
at 532-36; Developments-Employment Discrimination, supra note 3, at 1139-40.
44. The back pay provisions of Title VII are modeled after section 10(c) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970), which authorized "affirmative
action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay." For discussion
and analysis of the influence of the NLRA on Title VII remedies, see Davidson, "Back
Pay'" Awards Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 741 (1973)
1hereinafter cited as Davidson]; Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COMM.
L. REV. 431 (1966). For a detailed discussion of damage remedies under Title VII, see
DEVELOPMENTS-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 3, at 1259-69.
45. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II, 1972), provides:
[Tihe court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employ-
ment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may
include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without
back pay. ...
[VOL. XXXIV
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of Title VII and have given a broad reading to the Act's relief
provisions so as to remedy all discrimination."
In the instance case, however, despite finding that Albe-
marle's job seniority system had perpetuated discrimination, the
trial court reasoned that an award of back pay was unjustified in
view of the plaintiffs' lengthy delay in claiming back pay and the
defendant's apparent good faith. 7 Finding this reasoning unper-
suasive, the Fourth Circuit directed the trial court, on remand,
to award back pay.
The back pay issue in Moody presented the Fourth Circuit
with an additional opportunity to consider its holdings in
Robinson. s The Moody court not only found Robinson persuasive
but deemed it appropriate to reiterate and extend that decision's
back pay pronouncements.
Despite the dissent's attempt to distinguish the two cases,"
the facts in Moody and Robinson raising the back pay issue are
remarkably similar.
The plaintiffs in Moody initially brought suit in August,
1966.50 In response to Albemarle's motion for summary judgment
The courts' power to deny back pay in the face of an established violation of Title
VII has been exercised in the following cases: United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973) (denial
of back pay based, in part, upon difficulty of computation of loss suffered by each em-
ployee affected by defendant's discriminatory seniority system); Schaeffer v. San Diego
Yellow Cabs, Inc., 462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972) (back pay award limited because of
employer's reliance on similar legislation); Manning v. Int'l Union, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946 (1973) (where employer did not have benefit of judicial
interpretation of state's female protective statute, court's denial of back pay to women
discriminated against under the statute held not an abuse of discretion); Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) (deduction, not denial, of back pay from
unemployment compensation upheld as a proper exercise of discretion); Lea v. Cone Mills
Corp., 301 F. Supp. 97 (M.D.N.C. 1969), aff'd in pertinent part, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971)
(denial of back pay approved where plaintiff was found to have been only testing an
employer's hiring practices, not earnestly seeking employment); Richards v. Griffith Rub-
ber Mills, 300 F. Supp. 338 (D. Ore. 1969) (cases where back pay was refused by reason
of employer's good faith reliance on state laws limiting working hours for women).
46. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Rowe v. General Motors
Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Dillon Supply Co., 429 F.2d 800 (4th
Cir. 1970); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express Co., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969);
Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968) (compensatory pay granted for
refusal to promote).
47. Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 4 F.E.P. Cas. 561, 570 (E.D.N.C. 1971).
48. Supra note 22.
49. 474 F.2d at 145. Judge Boreman argued, in part, that Robinson is distinguisha-
ble from Moody in that the Moody plaintiffs' lengthy delay before retracting their dis-
claimer of back pay led to significantly greater prejudice to the employer's defense than
was present in Robinson. The dissent is dealt with more fully at text accompanying notes
80-86 infra.
50. 4 F.E.P. Cas. at 562.
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filed in November, 1966, 51 the plaintiffs stated that they were
seeking, as their exclusive remedy, injunctive relief from the com-
pany's discriminatory seniority and testing policies. Though the
plaintiffs initially expressed no desire for monetary relief, they
did communicate such an interest several years later, in June,
1970.52
In Robinson, the plaintiffs' complaint did not contain a re-
quest for back pay; it simply asked for "such other additional
relief as may appear to the Court to be equitable and just"5 3 in
the face of Lorillard's discriminatory seniority system. At an
ensuing pretrial hearing, the plaintiffs' attorneys declared that
the suit was one for injunctive relief and disclaimed any plans to
argue for recovery of lost wages. However, the plaintiffs did pre-
sent a belated claim for back pay after trial but before judgment
had been entered. 54
The manifest question presented in each case, then, was
whether Title VII's back pay remedy had been waived. The
Fourth Circuit responded in the negative in both instances.
The majority in Moody relied in part on the Seventh Cir-
cuit's 1969 decision in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.," the first
major Title VII case that involved back pay as a remedy for an
entire class.58 The suit was brought by female workers who had
been laid off because of Colgate's sex discrimination." The court
ordered back pay for the plaintiffs and stated:
ITihe clear purpose of Title VII is to bring an end to the
51. 474 F.2d at 145 n.14.
52. Id. at 145 n.15.
53. 444 F.2d at 802.
54. Id. at 803.
55. 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
56. Hill, The New Judicial Perception of Employment Discrimination-Litigation
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 U. COLO. L. REv. 243, 256 (1972)
Ihereinafter cited as Hill].
Judge Boreman suggests that, assuming that back pay relief should be granted, it is
appropriate only for the named plaintiffs in view of the plaintiffs' express disclaimer of
an intent to seek back pay for all class members. 474 F.2d at 146. However, Title VII itself
contains no bar to back pay recovery by class members, and most courts considering the
issue have ruled that class treatment of the back pay remedy is appropriate. In addition
to Robinson, supra note 22, and Bowe, supra note 55, examine Sprogis v. United Airlines,
Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971) (not a class
action), where a back award for all victims of discrimination without regard to whether
they were parties to the suit was recognized as a possibility on remand. But see Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 5 F.E.P. Cas. 421 (N.D. Ga. 1972). See generally Davidson, supra
note 44, at 741-51.
57. The respondents had restricted female employees to jobs requiring the lifting of
no more than thirty-five pounds.
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proscribed discriminatory practices and to make whole, in a
pecuniary fashion, those who have suffered by it. To permit
only injunctive relief in the class action would frustrate the
implementation of the strong Congressional purpose ex-
pressed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.18
Significantly, the Bowe remedy was granted in other jurisdic-
tions, for example, in Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.," and
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.60 In granting class relief in the form
of back pay, these cases reflect the proposition that back pay
awards serve to vindicate the public policy embodied in Title
VII-elimination of all employment discrimination .6
In this context, then, Judge Craven proceeded to dispose of
the "waiver-by-laches" and disclaimer arguments advanced by
the appellees and Judge Boreman's dissent." The dissent at-
tempted to distinguish Robinson-where the plaintiffs had dis-
claimed at a pretrial hearing an intent to seek back pay-from
Moody-where the complainants had made a similar disclaimer
during a preliminary phase of the suit-by arguing that Albe-
marle's reliance on the plaintiffs' initial disclaimer had signifi-
cantly prejudiced the mill's bargaining position and defense.
Judge Craven was not persuaded by the argument. He noted that:
[Blecause the obligation to provide back pay stems from
the same source as the obligation to reform the seniority
system, any general defenses relevant to the back pay award
were equally relevant to the suit for injunctive relief ...
The defendants have in no way been prejudiced by the be-
lated claim . 3
Having rejected the waiver argument as a basis for upholding
the trial court's decision, the court proceeded to consider whether
it should, nonetheless, follow the traditional attitude of reluc-
tance to reverse for "abuse of discretion" and thus affirm the
58. 416 F.2d at 720.
59. 321 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1971) (holding that class action could be maintained);
374 F. Supp. 1382 (D.D.C. 1974) (ordering back pay).
60. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). See Davidson, supra, note 44, at 748, and Hill,
supra note 56, at 254-55, for citations to additional cases in which class back pay awards
were made.
61. See, e.g., Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968); Oatis v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968). Cf. Newman v. Piggie Park Enter-
prises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (under Title II).
62. 474 F.2d at 146 n.16.
63. Id. at 141, quoting Robinson, supra note 22, at 803. See also United v. Hayes
Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1972), as authority to the effect that the issue of back
pay in civil rights cases should be determined even if not raised until after trial.
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decision. Judge Craven, exhibiting little patience with this atti-
tude, bluntly remarked: "Where a district court fails to exercise
its discretion with an eye to the purposes of the Act, it must be
reversed.""
Judge Craven then announced the Fourth Circuit's standard
with respect to the awarding of back pay: judicial discretion not-
withstanding, back pay-limited to damages actually suf-
fered-will be awarded as a matter of course to a prevailing plain-
tiff in the absence of "special circumstances that would render
such an award unjust."15 In so holding the court drew an analogy,
as it did in Lea v. Cone Mills," to Newman v. Piggie Park Enter-
prises, Inc.,67 a Title II (public accommodations) case, in which
the Supreme Court held, in part, that attorneys' fees should be
routinely granted,
Judge Craven's application of the Act so as to favor employee
relief would seem to be in accord with recent changes in the Act.
After a review of the effect of 1972 amendments 8 on remedies
under Title VII, the authors of a recent article conclude that
Congress "seems] to have adopted terms which reflect the rea-
soning of decisions giving wide reading to the remedial powers of
the Act."" They find support for this view in the section by sec-
tion analysis of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197270
64. 474 F.2d at 141-42. The court, citing Robinson, supra note 22, was likewise
unimpressed with the contention-advanced by both the district court and Albe-
marie-that back pay relief is inappropriate in cases where the defendant acted in good
faith. To the same effect, see Bowe, supra note 55, and Johnson v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 349 F. Supp. 3 (S.D. Tex. 1972). But see Kober v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973).
65. 474 F.2d at 142. As examples of circumstances which may justify the refusal or
limitation of back pay awards the majority cited Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, Inc.,
462 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1972) (where the employer relied on state labor law which limited
maximum working hours of women), and Le Blanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 333
F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 990 (1972) (involving reliance on a subsequently overturned state law).
66. 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971).
67. 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
68. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(Supp. I1, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970). The portion of the Act
which affects Title VII's relief provisions changed only the scope of the back pay remedy:
"Back pay liability shall not accrue from a date more than two years prior to the filing of
a charge with the Commission." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. II, 1972). For discussion
of the 1972 amendments to Title VII, see Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal
Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Sape &
Hartj.
69. Sape & Hart, supra note 68, at 880.
70. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15
(1970).
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that accompanied a House-Senate Conference Committee Re-
port: "'The provisions of this subsection [706(g)] are intended
to give courts wide discretion in exercising their equitable powers
to fashion the most complete relief possible.' "I'
Although, as previously noted, the Fourth Circuit's generous
position in regard to back pay awards is shared by other courts,7"
some jurisdictions have laid down standards which may signifi-
cantly circumscribe such awards. In a recent Title VII decision,
United States v. Georgia Power Co., the Fifth Circuit stated
that trial courts should consider limitations and laches in deter-
mining the appropriateness and amount of back pay awards. In
addition, district courts were directed to consider:
Factors of economic reality (i.e., the relative expense of ac-
curate determination of individual rights vis-A-vis the
amounts involved) and, most assuredly, the physical and
fiscal limitations of the court to properly grant and supervise
relief.74
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Railway Co.75 also placed a significant limitation on the
availability of back pay by denying back pay to all members of
the complaining class because of admittedly difficult problems of
proof presented by some of the plaintiffs' back pay claims. The
concern expressed in both Georgia Power Co. and St. Louis-San
Francisco Railway Co. for the burdens posed by computation of
back pay awards is certainly legitimate, but additional judicial
experience in the area and increasing use of the master available
under Rule 5376 may well serve to diminish such apprehensions.
As noted, the circuits seem not to be in complete agreement
on the breadth of the trial court's discretion. While the Sixth
Circuit has taken a position substantially in accord with Moody
by ruling "that the grant of [back pay] authority under title VII
should be broadly read and applied [so as generally to] mandate
an award of back pay,"77 the Third Circuit has taken a somewhat
71. Sape & Hart, supra note 68, at 881, quoting: 118 CONG. REC. S 3462 (daily ed.
March 6, 1972); 118 CONG. REc. H 1863 (daily ed. March 8, 1972) (emphasis added).
72. See notes 55-61 supra and accompanying text.
73. 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
74. Id. at 922. But see Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th
Cir. 1974), where the Fifth Circuit considerably softened its stance with respect to the
awarding of back pay.
75. 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973).
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b). See Davidson, supra note 44, at 753-70 for detailed discus-
sion of the problems associated with awarding and computing back pay in Title VII suits.
77. Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 496 F.2d 870, 876 (6th Cir. 1973). But cf.
1974]
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more restrained approach. In Kober v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp. 75 the court upheld the trial judge's denial of back pay where
the defendant had relied on a state statute before judicial resolu-
tion of its conflict with federal law. The court apparently found
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits' positions on back pay unpersua-
sive,75 and, emphasizing trial courts' discretion in deciding
whether to award back pay, ruled that back pay is not manda-
tory.
Judge Boreman's partial dissent 0 in Moody manifests a basic
philosophical divergence from the path the majority has taken in
pursuit of its determination to give full effect to Title VII's reme-
dies. The crux of the dissent's position is a refusal to accept Judge
Craven's equation of Title VII cases, which have granted attor-
neys' fees as a matter of course,8" with a similar position relative
to back pay awards. Judge Boreman draws the inference that,
because the authority for granting attorneys' fees and back pay
appears in two separate sections of Title VII,52 Congress intended
that they should be treated independently. The dissent argues
further that back pay should receive no greater presumption of
appropriateness than other equitable remedies.
The dissenting judge was also disturbed by the plaintiffs'
initial back pay disclaimer and the belated reversal of that posi-
tion. Rule 54(c) is cited to the effect that federal courts "shall
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his
Manning v. Int'l Union, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 946 (1973), a case
denying back pay in the face of proved discrimination where the employer was confronted
with conflicting state and federal laws.
78. 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973).
79. Id. at 247.
80. 474 F.2d at 142. Judge Bryan concurred in the court's back pay decision insofar
as it served as a means by which the victims of Albemarle's discriminatory job seniority
system could be compensated. 474 F.2d at 148.
81. In Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971), also a Title VII case,
Judge Boreman dissented from the court's liberal position regarding the awarding of
attorney's fees. After suggesting that the plaintiffs in Lea were not footing the legal
services bill and that therefore the court should deny them attorney's fees, Judge Boreman
caustically observed:
ITihis entire case smacks of nothing but manufactured litigation and, to employ
a rather harsh but well known characterization-"ambulance chasing"-with the
plaintiffs themselves serving merely as puppets or as pawns in the game. To me,
these "special circumstances" "would render such an award [of counsel fees]
unjust .. "
438 F.2d at 90.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970), authorizes attorney's fees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(Supp. II, 1972), provides for back pay.
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pleadings. 18 3 With this procedural straw man set up, Judge Bore-
man moves to knock him down, declaring that Rule 54(c) should
not be used as a basis for the grant of back pay where a party had
expressly disclaimed such relief.84 While the plaintiffs might have
treated Albemarle more equitably, their disclaimer hardly served
as a formal, binding commitment justifying complete reliance by
the defendant. As Judge Sobeloff remarked in Robinson, Rule
54(c) "has been liberally construed leaving no question that it is
the court's duty to grant whatever relief is appropriate on the
basis of the facts proved. The pleadings serve only as a rough
guide to the nature of the case.""5
The most telling questions raised by the dissent relate to the
financial implications of back pay awards in Title VII suits."
Concern for the effect on the business community of "potentially
enormous" awards underlies Judge Boreman's dissent. For exam-
ple, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and Lorillard Corporation
recently settled a case for five hundred thousand dollars in back
pay for the complaining class.87 Even more notable are the out-
of-court settlements made by AT&T 8 and the steel industry89 of
$15 million and $30.9 million, respectively, in back pay in suits
brought by the government. Congressional reaction to such devel-
opments echoes Judge Boreman's sentiments. While the 1972
amendments to Title VII generally left the nature of the Act's
remedies unchanged, the scope of the back pay remedy was nar-
rowed significantly. Back pay awards, heretofore unfettered, are
now limited to a two-year period prior to the filing of a complaint
with the EEOC. 0 Previously, the EEOC had argued" and at least
one case had indicated, 2 that such awards could be calculated
from July 2, 1965, the effective date of Title VII.
Although business interests have apparently 3 succeeded in
limiting their monetary liability under Title VII, Judge Bore-
man's concern remains important, for civil rights litigants may
83. 474 F.2d at 145, quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c) (emphasis added).
84. 474 F.2d at 146.
85. 444 F.2d at 803.
86. 474 F.2d at 146 n.16.
87. COOPER & RABB, supra note 2, at 349.
88. Davidson, supra note 44, at 741.
89. Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1974, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
90. See note 68 supra.
91. Sape & Hart, supra note 68, at 881 n.370.
92. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, AFL-CIO, Local 340 v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 4 F.E.P. Cas. 510, 512 (D. Kan. 1972).
93. But see Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), a Title
VII case in which the court awarded four million dollars in punitive damages.
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yet avoid the Title VII restriction on back pay by bringing suit
pursuant to 42 USC section 1981,11 a section originally enacted as
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Relying on the Supreme Court decisions in the housing
area, 5 federal courts have granted monetary relief in employment
discrimination suits brought under section 1981.96 Section 1981
contains no time limitations comparable to those of Title VII as
amended. One commentator succinctly described the implica-
tions as follows:
Title VII courts have measured back pay awards from the
effective date of the statute. Although section 1981 has only
recently been applied against private employers, the Su-
preme Court indicated in Jones that its interpretation would
not alter or overrule past law. On this basis, the computation
date for damages under section 1981 could be 1866, limited
only by the plaintiff's availability for employment and
maybe by the applicable statute of limitations.97
It is debatable, however, whether the huge back pay claims likely
to be made under section 1981 will in fact be sustained. Courts
may well choose to heed the Congressional purpose evident in
Title VII's new back pay limitation; if they do not, rapid moves
to amend section 1981 may be forthcoming.
Despite the difficulties associated with excessive awards,
timing of claims for relief, questions of mitigation," and compu-
tation of back pay for a large class," the Fourth Circuit's pre-
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,
and to no other.
95. For an overview of recent developments in this area, see Comment, Racial Dis-
crimination in the Private Housing Sector: Five Years After, 33 MD. L. REV. 289 (1973).
96. See, e.g., Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Young v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir.
1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
948 (1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
97. Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination
in Private Employment, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REV. 56, 98 (1972) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added).
98. See Lea v. Cone Mills, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971) (articulating a complainant's
duty to mitigate by seeking other employment). See generally Davidson, supra note 44,
at 753-70.
99. See generally Davidson, supra note 59, at 769-67, for discussion of the relevant
considerations in computing back pay awards.
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sumption of back pay relief has given greater force to an already
potent weapon. Indeed, since Title VII does not provide for crimi-
nal penalties and injunctions operate only prospectively, back
pay may well be the major deterrent against violation. 00 In sum,
it would seem fair to say that in light of Moody, class back pay
awards and settlements may be expected to have a powerfully
persuasive effect on indifferent as well as recalcitrant segments
of the business community.
Conclusion
The Moody decision offers two lessons to employers in the
Fourth Circuit. First, the EEOC Guidelines, which had been sug-
gested by the Supreme Court in Griggs as a model, now serve as
the legal yardstick by which employment testing devices are to
be measured. Second, and potentially the more threatening to
prospective defendant-employers, is the Moody court's expecta-
tion that trial courts will customarily grant back pay awards as
a remedy for the past effects of discriminatory practices.
For discussion of the propriety and implications of granting legal-as opposed to
equitable-remedies under Title VII, see Developments-Employment Discrimination,
supra note 3, at 1259-68.
100. See generally Rosenthal, Employment Discrimination and the Law, 407 ANNALS
OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 91, 95-96 (1973).
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